













































How are Turkey’s insecurities relevant to the analysis of its international 
relations? While it is interesting to look at how particular security con-
cerns have affected Turkey’s foreign policies at various moments in his-
tory, this article will take a different route. Following the distinction that 
David Campbell has drawn between “Foreign Policy” (through which 
others are rendered “foreign) and “foreign policy” (through which rela-
tions with others are managed), the article will explore how Turkey’s in-
securities have shaped a Foreign Policy that rests on the West/non-West 
divide. While the literature has analyzed specific acts of foreign policy 
and how they were crafted in response to specific military insecurities, 
the role that Turkey’s non-military and non-specific insecurities have 
played in shaping its international relations has remained understudied. 
Thus, the literature has not been able to fully account for the central-
ity of Turkey’s western orientation to its security. The argument here 
proceeds in three steps: First, the article draws attention to the necessity 
of looking at non-material as well as material insecurities in designing 
research on foreign policy. Second, it illustrates this necessity by focus-
ing on the case of Turkey’s foreign policy. Thirdly, in view of this second 
point the article highlights the centrality of Turkey’s western orientation 
(i.e., its Foreign Policy) to its security, more persuasively than studies 
that exclusively focus on the material aspects of security.
Keywords: Turkey, security, foreign policy, critical theory, identity
105
New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40 (2009): 105-125.

























How are Turkey’s insecurities relevant to the analysis of its international 
relations? While it is interesting to look at how particular security con-
cerns have affected Turkey’s foreign policy practices at various moments 
in its history, this article will take a different route. Following the distinc-
tion that David Campbell has drawn between “Foreign Policy” (through 
which others are rendered “foreign”) and “foreign policy” (through which 
relations with others who are rendered “foreign” are managed),1 this arti-
cle will explore how Turkey’s insecurities have shaped a “Foreign Policy” 
that rests on the West/non-West divide.2
 At a time when Turkey’s western orientation in general and relations 
with the European Union (EU)3 in particular are questioned at home 
and abroad,4 it is especially important to explore the insecurities that 
have shaped its international relations. While the literature analyzes 
1 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992).
2 Throughout the text, I will use the following two dichotomies interchangeably: civilized/ less-than-
civilized and West/non-West. Even though I acknowledge the differences between the two and do not 
want to essentialize them, it is pertinent to underscore how during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century civilization corresponded to the West in the minds of prominent European intellectuals and 
policy-makers. At the time, the term “West” was also used in opposition to the East. However, as dis-
tinct from to the Cold War period when East and West were differentiated in terms of their economic 
organization and ideological outlook, during this period the distinction was one of status vis-à-vis 
civilization. Ottoman self-understanding at the time could perhaps best be described as between two 
worlds. While the Ottomans continued to represent themselves as civilized, at the same time they 
bought into the notion of civilization as propounded by their European counterparts and sought to 
prove their civilized status vis-à-vis the European/International Society. See, Selim Deringil, “‘They 
Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 2 (2003).
3 Notwithstanding the significant advances made in Turkey’s relations with the EU since the latter’s 
1999 decision to recognize Turkey’s candidacy and the 2005 decision to begin membership negotia-
tions, relations remain strained. See, Gülnur Aybet, “Turkey and the EU after the First Year of Negotia-
tions: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (2006).
4 The following provide different accounts on Turkey’s difficult relations with the West in the post-post-
Cold War period: see, for example, Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation,” in Turkey’s 
New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, ed. Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (1993), 
Samuel P. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993), Ömer Taşpınar, “The 
Old Turks’ Revolt,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (2007), Ola Tunander, “A New Ottoman Empire? The 
Choice for Turkey: Euro-Asian Centre vs National Fortress,” Security Dialogue 26, no. 4 (1995). There 
is also Ahmet Davutoğlu’s best-selling book Stratejik Derinlik, in which the author has challenged not 
the western orientation, but the western focus of Turkey’s foreign policy and called for a more multi-
dimensional stance. See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001). While 
efforts to make Turkey’s foreign policy more multi-dimensional are not new, but go back as far as the 
1960s, Davutoğlu has justified the need for a multi-dimensional outlook with reference to Turkey’s 
historical and religio-cultural characteristics, which he takes as pre-given and immutable. Put differ-
ently, Davutoğlu has made a case for a change in Turkey’s foreign policy stance, not on geo-political, 

























specific acts of foreign policy and how they were crafted in response to 
specific military insecurities,5 the role that Turkey’s non-military and 
non-specific insecurities have played in shaping its international rela-
tions has remained understudied.6 Thus, the literature has not been able 
to fully account for the centrality of Turkey’s western orientation (i.e., its 
Foreign Policy) to its security. 
 This article aims to accomplish three things: First, it underscores the 
necessity of looking at both non-material and material aspects of se-
curity in foreign policy analysis. Second, it illustrates this necessity by 
focusing on the case of Turkey’s international relations. Thirdly, in view 
of the second point it highlights the centrality of Turkey’s western ori-
entation to its security, more persuasively than accounts that exclusively 
focus on the material aspects of security. It is argued that Turkey’s search 
to locate itself in the West could be read partly (but not wholly, for there 
is more to Turkey’s search for security than its western orientation, just 
as there is more to Turkey’s western orientation than its search for secu-
rity) as a response to non-military and non-specific insecurities of the 
early Republican era — namely, negotiating Turkey’s “difference” in the 
face of a European/International Society that was ambivalent towards 
its difference. This Foreign Policy over time has allowed specific acts of 
western-oriented foreign policy. 
In/security, identity and foreign policy
Prevalent approaches to international relations offer analyses of foreign 
policy that focus on specific threats encountered by states and poli-
cies devised to address them.7 This literature takes threats as a given 
and focuses on the process that begins once the specific issue at hand 
is identified as a threat to a particular country’s security. This litera-
ture understands policy in a narrow sense — in terms of responding 
5 For early examples, see, Metin Tamkoç, “Turkey’s Quest for Security through Defensive Alliances,” 
Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı 2 (1961), Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of 
National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976).
6 While there is a rich Political Science literature that examines the domestic political dynamics its 
insights seldom make their way into the study of Turkey’s international relations; see, for example, 
Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü, and Heinz Kramer, eds., Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cul-
tural Identities (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993), Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., Rethinking 
Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), Taha Parla 
and Andrew Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2004). On the apparent divide between the production of knowledge in Political Science and Interna-
tional Relations in Turkey, see, Boğaç Erozan and İlter Turan, “The Development of Political Science 
in Turkey,” PS (April 2004).
7 The most prominent example of this literature is: Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining 
























to threats, but not in terms of understanding how problems are turned 
into threats.8
 Critical approaches to International Relations have for a long time 
revealed the limits of such analyses.9 David Campbell’s groundbreaking 
Writing Security pointed to how Foreign Policy, through which states 
render others foreign, also sets the framework within which day-to-day 
relations with others are managed — that is, foreign policy. While main-
stream IR has focused on the latter, Campbell has shown how focus-
ing on the former provides deeper insight into the construction of state 
identity vis-à-vis others as well as of policies put into practice for shaping 
relations with others.10 For states do not just encounter threats. They 
take active part in constructing them as such; they make choices in favor 
of (or against) defining issues as threats.11 These choices are shaped by 
(and, in turn, shape) identities and interests, which have material and 
non-material aspects.12
 The contrast between prevalent approaches to foreign policy analy-
sis and their critics becomes clearer when one juxtaposes the insights 
gleaned from Graham Allison and Jutta Weldes’s respective analyses of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.13 Allison’s take on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis is in itself a critique of policy analyses that rely on the rational 
actor model (RAM). While useful when essential data required for the 
analysis of policy is not easily available, RAM is problematic in so far as it 
leaves too much to the guesswork of the analyst.14 What is more, it may 
8 From a critical perspective, the difference between threats and problems is not one of perception 
understood in the everyday sense of the term. Prevalent approaches to IR have incorporated the study 
of mis/perception into policy analysis in the 1970s; see, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Since then, advances in the 
study of perception in the field of cognitive psychology have further underscored how culture shapes 
perception. From a perspective that treats culture as a construct and acknowledges the role played 
by the politics of in/security in its construction, the process through which problems are turned into 
threats is the focus of analysis, as opposed to explaining this process away by invoking perception in 
the everyday sense of the term.
9 Mark Laffey, “Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action,” Review of Interna-
tional Studies 26, no. 3 (2000). Also see, Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).
10 Campbell, Writing Security.
11 See, Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations 2, 
no. 3 (1996).
12 See, Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
13 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York: Longman, 1999), Weldes, “Constructing National Interests.”, Jutta Weldes, “The Cultural Pro-
duction of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba,” in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, 
and the Production of Danger, ed. Jutta Weldes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
























produce misleading results, as Allison has revealed in his meticulous ar-
chival study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. While analysts who use RAM 
have explained the avoidance of nuclear war in 1962 with reference to 
the caution imposed on actors during times of nuclear standoff, Allison 
has cautioned against such confidence, arguing that the dynamics of or-
ganizational behavior and bureaucratic politics factor in the making and 
implementation of decisions in ways that RAM cannot capture.15
 Having successfully revealed the blind spots of RAM and called for 
integrating all three models in analyzing foreign policy, Allison left one 
question untouched: How did the crisis come about? In a manner typi-
cal of prevalent approaches to foreign policy analysis (of which he was 
otherwise critical), Allison focused only on how the crisis was man-
aged and resolved. He was not interested in the question of how the 
dangerous encounter between the United States, the Soviet Union and 
Cuba turned into a crisis, as opposed to a mere problem to be addressed 
through diplomatic channels. In Campbell’s terms, Allison’s research fo-
cused on the conduct of US foreign policy without inquiring into US 
Foreign Policy. The latter is an important question to ask, because what 
rendered the Cuban Missile Crisis a crisis, as Jutta Weldes has argued, 
was not the mere presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba or the strategic 
threat posed by those missiles. US policy-makers found particularly 
threatening the challenge that those missiles posed to US identity as the 
“leader of the Free World.”16 Put differently, it was not only the destruc-
tive capability of the missiles (the material factor), but also the destruc-
tive political consequences of the Soviet and Cuban daring and ability to 
transfer and plant those missiles in the US “backyard” (the non-material 
factor) that constituted a threat to its security. 
 Indeed, a prominent member of the US administration, Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara, was also of the opinion that it was not 
merely material factors that constituted US insecurities. Also worrying 
was the non-material threat posed by the very same missiles. At the time, 
the United States was considered to be holding “the West” together, by 
virtue of the extended deterrence it provided. Failing to stand against 
the Soviet Union in what the United States considered its own backyard 
would likely have had consequences for the broader security strategy of 
the United States. Had the United States not constructed its identity 
as “the leader of the Free World,” the crisis might have played out dif-
ferently, or the encounter may not have turned into a crisis at all. Hence 
15 Allison, Essence of Decision, Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision.
























the conclusion of Weldes et al.: “insecurity, rather than being external 
to the object to which it presents a threat, is both implicated in and an 
effect of the very process of establishing and re-establishing the object’s 
identity.”17
 In juxtaposing the insights of prevalent approaches to foreign pol-
icy analysis and their critics,18 and underscoring the insights that the 
latter provides into the mutually constitutive relationship between in/
security and identity, my aim is not to set the material and non-mate-
rial dimensions of security against each other. Rather, following criti-
cal approaches,19 I understand in/security as a whole with reference to 
both material and non-material dimensions. 
 That said, the abovementioned materialist bias of prevalent ap-
proaches to foreign policy analysis has so far resulted in relative ne-
glect of non-material insecurities, although non-material insecurities 
are integral to actors’ re-constitution of their identities and interests. 
What is more, non-material insecurities are no less real than material 
insecurities in terms of the anxieties that they cause or the destruction 
that they bring about. Consider western European insecurities in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. While the military aspect of 
western European insecurities have been accounted for in the litera-
ture (as with the threat of Soviet expansionism and German revival-
ism), critical approaches have also highlighted those non-military and 
non-specific insecurities about which actors in western Europe worried 
and to which they sought to respond through European integration. To 
quote Bill McSweeney:
17 See, Jutta Weldes, “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Commu-
nities, and the Production of Danger, ed. Jutta Weldes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999), 11.
18 See, among others, Michael N. Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to 
Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999), Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy 
as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” 
International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1993), Vendulka Kubálková, ed., Foreign Policy in a Con-
structed World (New York: ME Sharpe, 2001), Weldes, “Constructing National Interests.”, Weldes, 
“The Cultural Production of Crises.”, Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, “Making State Action Possible: 
The United States and the Discursive Construction of ‘the Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 25, no. 2 (1996).
19 See, for example, Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 
(1991), Ken Booth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner: 2005), Ken 
Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Barry Buzan, People, 
States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Frame-
work for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), Ole Waever, “Societal Security: The Concept,” in 
























Whatever the personal motives of the individuals who founded it, the 
EU was a security policy from its inception. Even with the calculated 
exclusion of military defence, the process of integration itself bound 
the member-states in a network of interdependence which made the 
recourse to military means of resolving disputes progressively more 
difficult.20
The threat to which western European actors were responding was non-
specific and non-military, because, unlike NATO’s targeting of possible 
Soviet expansionism, they had a less visible enemy. They sought to re-
spond to those insecurities that might follow a possible return to past 
conflicts structured around old conceptions of identity and interests.21 
That the threat to which they were responding was non-military and 
non-specific did not render it less real for the likes of Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schuman, who feared a return to Europe’s own past.22 Specific 
domestic and foreign policy acts that made European integration pos-
sible hinged upon this Foreign Policy that identified Europe’s own past 
as an other. Analyses that focus exclusively on the material aspects of 
security, however, have not been able to fully capture western European 
insecurities as such.
Turkey’s insecurities and its international relations
A similar materialist bias prevails in the study of Turkey’s international 
relations. An overview of the classics on Turkey’s foreign policy reveals a 
focus on specific military insecurities — consider, for example, the trea-
tises on Atatürk’s policy-making as a response to the insecurities of the 
Ottoman past, and on Cold War policies as a response to Soviet expan-
sionism.23 What remains under-examined are those non-military and 
non-specific insecurities that have also shaped Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
20 McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 7.
21 Ibid. Also see, Ole Waever, “Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in EU 
Studies,” Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995), Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security, and Ase-
curity in the West European Non-War Community,” in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and 
Michael N. Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
22 Waever, “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity.”
23 See, inter alia, Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (1919-1938) 
(Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1990), Ömer 
Kürkçüoğlu, “An Analysis of Atatürk’s Foreign Policy, 1919-1938,” Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk 
Yıllığı 20 (1980-1981), Haluk Ülman and Oral Sander, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler,” 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 27, no. 1 (1972), Oral Sander, Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Ankara: İmge 
Yayıncılık, 1998). For up-to-date analyses of Turkey’s foreign policies, see, Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış 
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 9 ed., 2 vols. (İstanbul: İletişim, 
























and foreign policy (as with the European/International Society’s am-
bivalence towards Turkey’s difference, see below).24 
 Second, even though Turkey’s western orientation is considered a 
factor in the analysis of its foreign policy, this orientation’s role in the 
mutually constitutive relationship between in/security and identity is 
rarely discussed. Indeed, those analyzing the role that identity plays in 
the shaping of security dynamics often do this in culturalist terms — 
that is, by falling back into treating identity as a given and immutable in-
dependent variable, as a determinant of foreign policy. Despite introduc-
tory disclaimers, such writings often overlook the constructed nature of 
identity and the mutually constitutive relationship between in/security 
and identity.25 
 Third, an emerging literature that explores the mutually constitu-
tive relationship between in/security and identity, treating both as de-
pendent variables, has traced how Turkey has sought to locate itself in 
the West, as opposed to the non-West.26 This literature has proven 
insightful in so far as it has revealed the consequences of Turkey’s For-
eign Policy on its foreign policy.27 What this literature has so far over-
looked are the insecurities that shaped Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 
first instance.28 
24 See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu’s groundbreaking analysis on the issue, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolu-
tion of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 
1 (2000). While the author emphasizes the significance of insecurities to the Ottoman Empire’s shift 
from considering Europe as unworthy of diplomatic representation to seeking membership in the 
Concert of Europe, his emphasis is on battleground losses. However, non-material insecurities (as 
with the European/International Society’s refusal to recognize the Ottoman Empire as fully sovereign, 
notwithstanding its membership to the Concert of Europe) are not discussed. Yet, negotiating their 
difference internationally in the face of the European/International Society’s ambivalence towards 
their difference was one of the dynamics behind the abovementioned shift in the Ottoman stance vis-
à-vis Europe. See, Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power 
in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).
25 See, for example, Hasan Kösebalaban, “The Permanent ‘Other’: Turkey and the Question of European 
Identity,” Mediterranean Quarterly 18, no. 4 (2007): 110.
26 See, for example, Bahar Rumelili, “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding 
the EU’s Mode of Differentiation,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2004), Bahar Rumelili, 
“Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 
(2008), Pınar Bilgin, “A Return to ‘Civilisational Geopolitics’ in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopo-
litical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era,” Geopolitics 9, no. 2 (2004). 
For a discussion with reference to the ‘Eastern’ dimension to Turkey’s security/identity conundrum, 
see, Meliha B. Altunışık and Özlem Tür, “From Distant Neighbours to Partners? Changing Syrian-
Turkish Relations,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 (2006).
27 Following the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the West, vis-à-vis which Turkey’s west-
ernness had been reaffirmed, Turkey’s identity politics ran into difficulty. See, Gülnur Aybet and Melt-
em Müftüler-Baç, “Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey’s Problematic 
Relationship with Europe,” International Journal 55, no. 4 (2000).
























 An appreciation for Turkey’s insecurities in the analysis of its inter-
national relations lies at the heart of this article. While the military inse-
curities that Turkey has experienced and the specific foreign policy acts 
designed in response to them have been accounted for in the literature,29 
non-military and non-specific insecurities that have also shaped Tur-
key’s international relations have been left unexamined. This article con-
stitutes a preliminary inquiry in this direction. For reasons of space, no 
detailed account of Turkey’s western orientation or its insecurities will 
be presented here. 
 Taking my cue from how critical approaches render European 
integration a response to insecurities of a non-military and non-
specific nature, in the following, I will offer a preliminary reading of 
Turkey’s Foreign Policy as a response to non-military and non-spe-
cific insecurities of the early Republican era. The threat to the Re-
public of Turkey was non-military in that the gains of the National 
Struggle had been sealed through the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Yet, 
while Lausanne had reaffirmed Turkey’s hard-won sovereignty, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity, the founding leaders were never-
theless concerned about the fragility of such recognition, given the 
European/International Society’s ambivalence toward their differ-
ence.30 The threat to which they sought to respond was non-specific 
in that they were not targeting a specific act of a specific counterpart. 
Rather, they responded to what the future may bring, based on their 
particular remembrances of the past and interpretations of the pres-
ent. One such remembrance was that non-military insecurities (the 
withholding of recognition as a full member of the European/Inter-
national Society) had consequences for military security (instances 
of military intervention and/or loss of sovereignty experienced in 
some parts of Asia and Africa). Thus, Turkey’s international rela-
tions came to rest on the West/non-West divide partly as a response 
to non-military and non-specific insecurities vis-à-vis the European/
International Society.
 This is not how the story is usually told. Turkey is invariably rep-
resented as having turned to the West only after World War II and as 
part of an attempt to avoid being integrated into the Eastern Bloc by the 
29 See, inter alia, Tamkoç, “Turkey’s Quest for Security through Defensive Alliances.”, Tamkoç, The War-
rior Diplomats, Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture.”, Duygu B. Sezer, 
“Turkey’s Security Policies,” Adelphi Papers, no. 164 (1981).
30 Such ambivalence has been read differently in various political science and history accounts. Con-
sider, among others, Aslı Çırakman, From the “Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of Europe”: 
European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth (New 
























Soviet Union. Indeed, Turkey’s international relations until 1939 were 
characterized as one of “relative autonomy,”31 and between 1939 and 
1945 as one of “active neutrality.”32 Thus, Turkey’s NATO membership 
(1952) is viewed as the turning point in the history of its internation-
al relations by enthusiasts as well as critics of its Western orientation. 
However, while the founding leaders’ pragmatism meant refraining from 
foreign policy acts that would have tied Turkey to one allegiance well 
until the end of WWII, Turkey’s Foreign Policy was far less ambigu-
ous throughout this period. From its inception, Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
has rested on the West/non-West divide. That is to say, while Turkey’s 
Western-oriented foreign policy did not crystallize until the years before 
World War II, its Foreign Policy took an explicitly Western turn as early 
as in the 1920s.
 While Turkey’s modernization and/or westernization have been an-
alyzed in great detail,33 insecurities of a non-military and non-specific 
kind have remained unarticulated. Put differently, if “the conceptualiza-
tion of the West, whether as an idealisation or as an accusation, influ-
ences directly the praxis of social actors” in Turkey (and elsewhere),34 
it is not only due to domestic political dynamics (as with the desire to 
benefit from the fruits of the Enlightenment, or the wish to emulate the 
success of the nation-state model), or to the urge to escape battlefield 
losses, but also because of the ambivalent attitude of the European/In-
ternational Society vis-à-vis non-western others. 
Encounters with European/international society as a source of insecurity
A growing body of critiques of the International Society School (also 
known as the English School) have looked at, among other things, Eu-
rope’s encounter with non-Europeans and their mutual transformation. 
Particularly insightful are critical accounts of the period during which 
the Chinese, Japanese and Ottoman empires sought membership in the 
European/International Society. In contrast to mainstream Internation-
31 Baskın Oran, “Dönemin Bilançosu,” in Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Bel-
geler, Yorumlar, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), 257, Mehmet Gönlübol, ed., Olaylarla Türk 
Dış Politikası (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1969), William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1744-
2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
32 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
33 See footnote 6.
34 Nilüfer Göle, “Engineers: Technocratic Democracy,” in Turkey and the West: Changing Political and 
Cultural Identities, ed. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü, and Heinz Kramer (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993). 
For cases other than Turkey, see, for example, Sankaran Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri 
Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), Timothy 
























al Society writings — which have explained the expansion of the Eu-
ropean/International Society as one of a benevolent Europe exporting 
its values and institutions of civilized statecraft, and/or non-Europeans 
“adhering to the common interests and values, binding rules and insti-
tutions of the nineteenth-century international society which self-con-
sciously characterised itself as ‘civilized’”35 — non-western encounters 
with the European/International Society were suffused with insecuri-
ties.36 Reactions to the portrayal of the non-western as not deserving 
to rule (by virtue of being less-than-civilized) and the interlinked Euro-
pean claim to better rule had taken various forms, including the search 
for removing the grounds for the claim to such superiority. Indeed, in 
an unequal setting where the hierarchical binaries of western/eastern 
or civilized/less-than-civilized were defined by the powerful, feigning 
similarity, seemingly becoming and being modern, civilized, western of-
ten emerged as a primal form of response.37 The non-western often re-
sorted to feigning similarity, because it was on the basis of a hierarchical 
classification of nations (civilized vs. less-than-civilized) that colonial-
ism had been justified for years.38
 The critics of the International Society School thus help us under-
stand post-colonial insecurities by way of decoding the survival tactics 
adopted to escape colonization and/or intervention of one form or an-
other. As such, they help highlight the mutual transformation in the 
identities and interests of westerners and non-westerners, as the latter 
struggled to pass the test of a standard of civilization set by the former. 
Providing a full account of the insights of post-colonial critique is be-
yond the scope of this article. Let me focus, by way of illustration, on 
the concept of civilization, which was also central to the discourses of 
Turkey’s founding leaders. 
35 Gerrit W. Gong, “China’s Entry into International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, 
ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Also see the other contributions 
to Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984).
36 See, Yongjin Zhang, “China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization’,” 
Review of International Studies 17 (1991), Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Mak-
ing of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Shogo Suzuki, Civilisation 
and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society (London: Routledge, 
2009).
37 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), L. H. M. Ling, Postcolonial In-
ternational Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), 
L. H. M. Ling, “Cultural Chauvinism and the Liberal International Order: “West vs. Rest” In Asia’s 
Financial Crisis,” in Power in a Postcolonial World: Race, Gender and Class in International Relations, 
ed. Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (London: Routledge, 2002).
38 This reading does not in any way rule out and/or diminish other concerns behind modernization and/
























 The International Society is an institution that originated in the 
practices of European states. These practices were initially designed 
to regulate affairs among Christian states of Europe so as to minimize 
friction and violence. As religious concerns gave way to secular ones in 
an attempt to remove religious arguments from the realm of politics,39 
Christianity disappeared as the primary marker of the identity of the 
European/International Society and was replaced by “civilization.” The 
need for regulating relations with non-Europeans led to the emergence 
of a set of criteria referred to as the “standards of civilization,” detailing 
what Europeans expected from non-Europeans if they wished to be a 
part of and benefit from the privileges that membership accrued.40 
 In International Society terms, standards of civilization refer to “the 
assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish those that belong to 
a particular society (by definition the ‘civilised’).”41 Initially formulated 
to overcome the obstacles European actors encountered in their dealings 
with Others, the standards of civilization also proved instrumental for 
some imperial powers in their colonial dealings.42 While those who were 
altogether outside the European/International Society were considered 
not deserving of self-governance (as with parts of Asia and Africa), oth-
ers in the process of meeting the standards with a view to joining endured 
intervention of one form or another (such as China and Japan). 
Early republican insecurities vis-à-vis European/international society
Although the literature points to the year 1856 as the date when the 
Ottoman Empire was recognized as having passed the test of the stan-
dards of civilization and gained entry into the European/International 
Society,43 the fact that capitulations remained in place suggests that the 
empire was still considered a less-than-full member.44 The Republic of 
39 Michael C. Williams, “Identity and the Politics of Security,” European Journal of International Rela-
tions 4, no. 2 (1998).
40 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977), Bull and Watson, eds., The Expan-
sion of International Society, Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
41 Gong, “China’s Entry into International Society.”
42 After all, non-western Others were not always more tolerant towards difference or accepting of equal-
ity in treatment. See, Hedley Bull’s foreword to Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International 
Society Also see, Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’.”, Ling, Postcolonial 
International Relations, Suzuki, Civilisation and Empire.
43 See, Thomas Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” in The Expansion of In-
ternational Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Also see, A. 
Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” in Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or 
Unconventional?, ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2004), Fikret Adanır, “Turkey’s Entry 
into the Concert of Europe,” European Review 13, no. 3 (2005).
























Turkey inherited some of these concerns by virtue of being a succes-
sor to the Ottoman Empire,45 and its founding leaders’ formative years 
having been shaped by the Ottoman ordeal.46 In the following, I will 
suggest that the Foreign Policy of locating Turkey firmly in the West 
as opposed to the non-West was partly a response to insecurities. The 
newly established republic was in need of recognition as an equal by the 
great powers of Europe (a non-material threat), thereby removing the 
grounds for intervention and making room for sovereign development 
(a material threat). 
 Initial encounters of Turkey’s founding leaders with the ambivalence 
of the European/International Society towards their difference occurred 
during the National Struggle when, in the words of Enver Ziya Karal, 
the Allies did not hesitate to use civilisation themselves as a pro-
paganda instrument to divide Turkey. They claimed that the Turks 
in history had never been the creators of any masterpieces of civi-
lisation. Furthermore, they claimed that the Turks had always been 
strangers to Western civilisation and had even attempted to destroy 
it. This propaganda resulted in the claim that Turks did not deserve 
to survive as an independent nation.47
Such ambivalence remained even after the National Struggle had come 
to an end. One of the thorniest issues at Lausanne was the capitula-
tions. Particularly distressful for the team representing Turkey had been 
their western counterparts’ reasoning that the capitulations had had to 
remain in place, because “Turkey was a backward country and still under 
Islamic law.”48
 European actors’ propaganda during the National Struggle and the 
difficulties encountered during the Lausanne Treaty negotiations seem 
to have driven home the lesson that winning the war on the battlefield 
of its military power. Over time, the power balance shifted between the Ottoman Empire and its Eu-
ropean counterparts. They were removed with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty.
45 See, Metin Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 
1 (2000).
46 See, Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965). The final stages of 
the Ottoman ordeal are documented in İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (İstanbul: Hil 
Yayınları, 1983).
47 Enver Ziya Karal, “The Principles of Kemalism,” in Atatürk: The Founder of a Modern State, ed. Ali 
Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (Hamden: Archon Books, 1981).
48 Cited in Andrew Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic Reconsideration 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). On Lausanne negotiations, see, Ali Naci Karacan, Lozan 
Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa (İstanbul: İstanbul Maarif Matbaası, 1943), Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü: The 
























and the negotiating table were not enough, unless the grounds for the 
European/International Society’s claim to better rule was removed as 
well. Halil İnalcık has highlighted the parallels during this period “be-
tween Turkish claims to be a fully independent modern nation-state and 
as such to ask for equal treatment at Lausanne, and Kemal’s promises of 
taking radical measures to modernise Turkey during his Anatolian tour 
in 1923.”49 Recognizing not only the fragility of formal recognition by 
the European/International Society, but also the potential insecurities 
that were likely to follow in the eventuality of the withdrawal of such 
recognition, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk set the goal of lifting Turkey up 
to the level of contemporary civilization and set in motion a plan that 
involved organizing a conference on national economy (to express Tur-
key’s commitment to liberal economy), convening of a committee for 
legal reforms (to signal the intention to adopt European law in civil mat-
ters), and going on a tour of Anatolia to discursively make the case for 
Turkey’s modernization and secularization.50 
 The abovementioned critical scholars underscore the importance 
of battlefield gains when they note that it was not Ottoman efforts to 
meet the standards of civilization, but the military success of the Na-
tional Struggle that was decisive for Turkey eventually being recognized 
as fully sovereign.51 Yet, even though the National Struggle was won 
and formal recognition of Turkey as an independent and sovereign state 
achieved with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey’s founding 
leaders remained apprehensive regarding the ambivalence in the Euro-
pean/International Society’s treatment of the young republic. Consider 
the following quote by one of Atatürk’s closest friends, Falih Rıfkı Atay, 
who put the choices facing Turkey at the time in dramatic terms: “We 
were either going to become European or […] the seven-fanged impe-
rialist beast called Düveli Muazzama [great powers of Europe] was go-
ing to break us up and turn into Asian hordes.”52 The national anthem 
of Turkey, which was adopted during the National Struggle, expressed 
similar sentiments in equally dramatic terms when it referred to Düveli 
Muazzama as “that one-fanged beast that you call civilization.”53 
49 See, Halil İnalcık, Turkey and Europe in History (İstanbul: Eren, 2006).
50 For a discussion on the securityness of secularism in Turkey, see, Pınar Bilgin, “The Securityness of 
Secularism? The Case of Turkey,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 6 (2008).
51 Zhang, “China’s Entry into International Society.”
52 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya (Ankara: Bateş, 1980).
53 Here is the fourth verse of the ten-verse poem in full: “The lands of the West may be armored with 
walls of steel/ but I have borders guarded by the mighty chest of a believer./ Recognize your innate 
strength, my friend!/ And think: how can this fiery faith ever be killed/ by that battered, single-fanged 
























 The ambivalence in the European/International Society’s treatment 
of Turkey’s difference found its match in the ambivalence of the Repub-
lican leaders’ approach to the European/International Society. The West 
was a source of both inspiration and insecurity. Turkey’s founding lead-
ers considered themselves facing a predicament similar to the one faced 
by post-colonial peoples in other parts of the world; either feign similar-
ity, or risk loss of full sovereignty and independence. Again, this is not to 
reduce Turkey’s modernization and/or westernization to seeking simi-
larity (understood in the everyday sense of the term), but to underscore 
the parallels in the experiences of various peoples in their encounters 
with the European/International Society.
 The point made here is slightly different from the one frequently 
made in the literature regarding Atatürk’s mistrust of European diplo-
macy. Atatürk is quoted to have said in the early years of the National 
Struggle that “our nation’s fault is to have manifested over-confidence 
in the honesty of Europe.”54 While such mistrust has been explained 
with reference to Atatürk’s foreign policy stance of “no total confidence 
in friends or the outer world,”55 the productive tension between seeing 
the West as a source of inspiration as much as insecurity is better cap-
tured by the notion of ambivalence.56
The significance of capturing ambivalence as a source of insecurity
The otherwise rich literature detailing various aspects of Turkey’s rela-
tions with the West/Europe has so far failed to fully capture the above-
mentioned ambivalence and insecurities that followed, for it has focused 
on highlighting Turkey’s otherness to Europe,57 but not vice versa. The 
literature on Turkey’s relations with the European Union, in turn, has 
focused on Turkey’s quest for accession to European integration while 
overlooking the insecurities involved. Indeed, not even those who ques-
tion the appropriateness of Turkey’s goals question the dynamics behind 
this difficult relationship.58 Taken together, the apparent persistence 
54 Cited in Kürkçüoğlu, “An Analysis of Atatürk’s Foreign Policy,” 138.
55 Ibid. Also see, Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture.”
56 On Japan and China’s handling of such ambivalence, see, Suzuki, Civilisation and Empire.
57 See, for example, Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition: 
An Addendum to the Literature on International Society,” Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 
(1991), Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1999), Nilüfer Göle, “Europe’s Encounter with Islam: What Future?,” 
Constellations 13, no. 2 (2006), Jose Casanova, “The Long, Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey 
into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization,” Constellations 13, no. 2 (2006).

























of some European actors’ ambivalence regarding Turkey’s difference,59 
Turkish actors’ particular remembrances of the past and interpretations 
for the present as colored by their own ambivalence, and their reaction 
to European rhetoric/behavior all underscore the need for further scru-
tinizing the dynamics behind Turkey’s western orientation. 
 Failing to fully capture the centrality of Turkey’s insecurities to its 
international relations is likely to have implications for our understand-
ing of the future of Turkey’s western orientation. For when Turkey’s 
western orientation is reduced from being an identity choice (Foreign 
Policy) to mere Cold War policy preference (foreign policy), it becomes 
difficult to understand its enduring centrality for Turkey’s international 
relations. Indeed, critics, including ambassador-without-portfolio Ah-
met Davutoğlu, have been quick to argue that, now that the Cold War 
is over, Turkey need not put so much emphasis on the West, but instead 
should diversify its relations.60 Hence recent calls for Turkey to de-em-
phasize its western orientation.
 While efforts to make Turkey’s foreign policy more multi-dimen-
sional go back as far as the 1960s,61 Davutoğlu, among others, has ar-
ticulated the need for a multi-dimensional outlook in terms of Turkey’s 
historical and religio-cultural characteristics. His argument takes as pre-
determined what Turkey is ( Foreign Policy) and offers what its foreign 
policy should be. To re-state in the language of foreign policy analysis, 
while paying attention to the non-material dimension of international 
relations and thus seeming to adopt a critical perspective, Davutoğlu’s 
argument is no less deterministic than prevalent approaches to for-
eign policy analysis in that the author treats identity as pre-given and 
immutable (that is, in culturalist terms). The only difference between 
Davutoğlu’s account and prevalent approaches to foreign policy analysis 
consists of putting culture and identity in place of military threat, taken 
as pre-given. No room is left in Davutoğlu’s account for the mutually 
constitutive relationship between in/security and identity. 
 Let me further clarify this point by referring to another author writ-
ing on the same subject: 
On the one hand, by rejecting Turkey, Europe would stress its 
commitment to a culturally defined European identity with a sin-
59 See, for example, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and the 
Prospects of Turkish Accession,” Review of International Studies 32 (2006).
60 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik.

























gular civilisational identity. On the other, by embracing Turkey, it 
would move beyond the cultural paradigm and transform itself to 
a geographically defined entity embracing a multiplicity of civilisa-
tions.62
While starting from a premise that acknowledges the constructed na-
ture of identities, the author, by way of treating culture and civilization 
as pre-given and immutable, ends up denying the constructed nature of 
the categories upon which he builds his argument. Therefore, the au-
thor’s treatment of identity comes across as no less culturalist.
 Even though Turkey’s preference for identifying itself as western has 
ended up alienating some parts of the non-West and resulted in forego-
ing the capital of a potentially more cosmopolitan identity that embraces 
its own interstitiality,63 this need not render research into the dynamics 
behind the choice of that specific Foreign Policy a historical curiosity. It 
remains to be argued whether such insecurities have lost their relevance 
in contemporary world politics altogether. For, while Turkey embracing 
its interstitiality is a cause for celebration in the eyes of some European 
actors,64 it remains a source of insecurity to others, given their ambiva-
lence towards difference. Be that as it may be in the policy realm, this 
article has made a case for the relevance of understanding the centrality 
of western orientation to Turkey’s international relations.
Conclusion
Turkey’s western orientation has yet another dimension so far barely 
examined in the literature — that of in/security of the non-military 
and non-specific kind. Even before Turkey began to follow an explicitly 
western-oriented foreign policy, its Foreign Policy had taken a westward 
turn — by virtue of the founding leaders’ efforts to locate Turkey in con-
temporary civilization. Turkey’s western-oriented Foreign Policy, as this 
article has argued, was a crucial aspect of its search for security in the 
face of a European/International Society that had, in the past, refused 
equal treatment to the Ottoman Empire. At the time, the Foreign Policy 
of locating Turkey in the West allowed the founding leaders to claim the 
right to be treated equally and with respect. Furthermore, this Foreign 
Policy allowed for more specific acts of western-oriented foreign policy 
in the following years — as with the decision to join the Anglo-French 
62 Kösebalaban, “The Permanent ‘Other’.”
63 Rumelili, “Negotiating Europe.”
64 This is so either because they believe in a true self (culturalist), or because they take interstitiality to 
























alliance on the eve of World War II, to become a member of NATO in 
1952, and to seek European Union membership.
 The non-specific and non-military security problem encountered by 
Turkey’s founding leaders was one of negotiating their difference inter-
nationally in the face of the European/International Society’s ambiva-
lence towards their difference. A solution was found in lifting Turkey to 
the level of contemporary civilization. That civilization no longer carries 
the same meaning as it did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century need not render such analysis less significant.65 Nor does it di-
minish the significance of the notion of (standards of ) civilization for 
world politics. As Gerrit W. Gong reminds us, 
The standard of civilisation is not just a historical curiosity, an idea 
important only to a bygone era, significant as it may have been [...] 
Insights into the extent to which the standard of ‘civilisation’ was forc-
ibly imposed, reluctantly accepted, or eagerly embraced are essential 
to understanding the underlying structural strengths and weaknesses 
of today’s international society.66
The fact that the insecurities experienced by non-westerners were non-
military and non-specific does not render them less real. The insecuri-
ties that shaped Turkey’s Foreign Policy at the time of its founding were 
very real. Moreover, they remain essential to understanding Turkey’s 
present-day international relations. 
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